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Issues of Eternal Jīvātmā: A Review Based on Nyāya Philosophy

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Abstract:

Maharishi Gautama discusses the sixteen types of substances in the first Sūtra of the first ahnika of the first chapter of the Nyāyadarshan. According to the principles of Nyāya philosophy, the second substance is the Prameya or the knowledge. Prameya or the knowledge are twelve substances. The first known substance of these is the soul. Ātman is the creator of all happiness and sorrow, the consumer of happiness and sorrow, the knower of happiness and sorrow. The soul is eternal, embodied, beginningless and many in number. The soul is dual. Namely:-1.Jīvātmā, 2.Paramātmā. Tattva knowledge about soul-like matter leads to salvation by discarding all false knowledge of that subject. The main topic of this article is to discuss eternal life based on Nyāya philosophy. But there are many doubts about whether the soul is eternal. Therefore, in Nyāya philosophy, Vedas have accepted the eternality of life by neutral reasoning.

Keywords: Ātman, Jīvātmā, Eternity, Immortality, Emanation and Purification, Rebirth of Soul, Transientism, Apparition.

Nyāyadarshan admits the additional soul of the body, but the doubt whether that soul is eternal or impermanent (not nitya) cannot be removed. Because 'existing matter is of two types, eternal and Non-eternal'. Now the question is what is eternal? The answer can be said, that which is Apratiyogin by antecedent and Apratiyogin by destruction is eternal. Hence, which is beginningless and infinite is eternal.

Of course, while proving that there is a soul in addition to the body, it is proved by Recognition that the soul that is present in the old body was also present in the previous childhood body of that body. But what is the proof that this soul will exist even after leaving the body? In the Vedas Says, of course, the soul is called Eternal (nitya). It is said in Chandogya Upanishads that the body dies, but the living being is abandoned. The

Bṛihadaranyaka Upanishads says – the soul kills this body and assumes another body and takes you there. It is said in the Gita- He who knows this Atman as imperishable, eternal, birthless and eternal, etc. But those who do not accept the authority of the Vedas and Gita will not be satisfied with this statement. That is why the Nyāya Darshan Veda Pramāṇa has established the eternality of the soul through Neutral reasoning.

Nyāyadarshan says that Newborn babies do not know the reasons for joy, fear and grief, because they have no experience of all these things. Moreover, after getting something, they get angry, and if they don't get something, they get sad. We can guess this intense grief by seeing his laughter and crying. Since he did not experience happiness or sorrow in the present birth due to the attainment or non-attainment of objects, it is proved that this harsha or sorrow arose due to the recollection of previous things. Remembrance does not happen without prior experience, prior experience is also possible only if there is previous birth in this case. Therefore, it can be concluded that this embodied soul continues to exist even after the destruction of a previous body.

Now the Pūrvapakṣa-vādi can say's just as there is development and compression in the eternal lotus, the eternal soul will also undergo a harshashoka form. For this what is the need for Previous births or eternal life of the soul?

The commentator Vātsyāyana replies that the illustration is given, but no motive is mentioned, so the illustration fails. Moreover, this example does not exclude the child's reason for grief. If the young or the old have a preconceived grief, if there is a predisposing cause to the recollection, such a cause is inevitable for the newborn child. By the verb, the cause of the verb is also assumed. There is, of course, a reason for the prabodha and conjugation of padmapatra verbs. As a matter of fact, the lotus produced from the mixture of Panchabhuta has the characteristics of summer, winter and rainy season. There is a reason for emotional changes in children like joy, fear and grief etc. And that reason cannot be anything other than pre-habitation, pre-habitation also allows previous birth, the soul exists even after leaving the body, hence it is eternal. Proving that Another special proof beginningless of the soul is the desire to suckle the newborn child. At birth, the baby has the instinct to suckle. This instinct indicates his desire. This desire is not possible without the recollection of hunger suppression due to previous breastfeeding, so this desire is a sign of pre-habitation. If a newborn child's preconceptions are to be followed, it completes the previous birth itself.

The immanentists of the soul object that the iron moves towards the magnet without habit, just as the child moves towards the mother's breast without habit.

The eternalist theorists of the soul say, is the iron that moves towards the magnet, it is pure or non-pure? If there is non-pure, then the iron will also move towards magnet. In fact, iron moves towards iron and that iron also does not move towards any stone etc other than iron. By this law of motion, the law of its cause is fulfilled. So, when the newborn baby is hungry and moves towards the mother's breast, there is a specific reason for this movement. The habit of eating after birth can have no other motive than the remembrance of hunger.

Therefore, because there is no pure instinct, the eternality of the soul is achieved in absolute perfection by the desire to suckle.

Patanjali, in his *yogasūtra*, says:

‘svarasavahi vidusho ‘pi tatha rudho ‘bhiniveshah’

That is, that which originates from the previous fear of death and which is present even in learned persons is called *abhinivesha*. By fearing the death of the animal in the present birth, he has created the sense of the death of the previous birth and thereby the existence of the previous birth. Commenting on the *Patanjalasūtra*, Maharishi Vedavyas said, ‘All beings always have this desire in themselves, that I may not come to impermanence, that I may live. He who has not experienced death as the soul’s exodus can never have this form of desire. This indicates that there is a sense of previous birth. If there is a sense of previous birth, then the previous birth is complete.

A further proof of the impermanence of the soul is the lack of desireless beings in all things. All beings are born with desires. Remembrance of the past is the source of desire or anger. Precognition is not possible through pre-birth, therefore there must be pre-birth, the soul is eternal. Maharishi Gautama previously applied the innate anger of the child mother at birth to the perpetuation of the soul by saying that the infant’s longing for the breast is a sign of birth.

Atheists may say of course – how can it be known that the desires of the newborn animal are due to the feelings of the previous birth? Just as the qualities of *utpati dharmaka dravya* are produced by a cause, so the quality of *utpati dharmaka atman* is also produced by a cause. When *ghat* arises, its form etc. qualities arise, when that form of soul arises, *ragas* arise in it. So what is the need for acknowledgment of previous birth?

The *Naiyayikas* reply to the objections of the Atheists that there must be a need for it. Because soul and anger do not originate like *saguna* originates. Desire for wonder or anger arises from determination. Preconceived prayer is determination. This prayer is for the recollection of preconceived matters. So it can be assumed that the newborn child is angry because of the recollection of preconceived matters. The memory of preconceived matters undoubtedly perfects the previous birth.

If there was an origin of the soul, then the quality of *raga* could have originated in it, just like the origin of the quality in the work. But the origin of the soul is not perfect, so the example of the origin of the *rupadi guna* to cause action is *asidva*. And if one rejects *Sankalpa* and calls ignorance in the form of *dharmadharma* the cause of anger, then only previous births are accepted. Because that *dharma* originated in the previous body, not in this life.

According to Buddhism, which is the existence (*sat*) is impermanent. Which is the existence (*sat*) is transitory, so the soul is the existence (*sat*) is transitory. If the soul is transitory, then the permanence of the soul recognized by *Nyāyadarshan* becomes fragile.

Maharishi Gautama showed the inadequacy of ephemerally in the second Ānvīśikī of the third chapter of Nyāyadarshan. Naiyaikacharya Uddyotakara in the Chartudashasūtra of the varttika has extensively discussed ephemeralism, refuting the phrase ‘everything is temporary’, its middle term ‘sattva’ and examples such as ‘Jaldhar’. By searching the various meanings of the word momentary, he found that the word momentary is meaningless, nominal.

All those arguments are not presented here for fear of elaboration. Since we will prove the existence of the soul according to Nyāya, we will establish the eternity of the soul by showing the error of this view because if we do not refute the theory of the soul according to Buddhism, our work will not be accomplished.

Indeed, which is the existence(sat) is temporary. Therefore, the soul is also Momentarians accept the memory or recognition of visible objects. If the material moment is destructive, the material that the soul has seen, As it perishes at the second moment of the origin of the soul, not having the same doer of remembrance of visions in the past, “I who saw it, I see it, how does such remembrance arise? But similar experience is popular. Here also the ephemeral ‘I saw’, thus knowing me as the doer of vision and recollection. How will he invite the self-interview in the form of ‘Aham’ i.e. I? Therefore the soul is not transient.

Remembrance arises as a result of Impressions of karmic forces (samskāra) and recollection is not possible unless the soul who is the doer of that Impressions of karmic forces (samskāra) is also not up to the time of remembrance. According to momentaryism, reformation also perishes at the second moment of origin. The soul is also subject to that rule. Therefore, remembrance does not arise. This results in a sense of memory in reality, and thus the inferential function is continuously going on. Momentary recollection of the soul is impossible, because what is seen by one soul cannot be remembered by another soul, then the soul is impermanent and ephemeral.

Buddhists believe in causation. This is the conclusion of the Buddhists that decay causes new creation and new creation is the function of that decay. Now the question is, can causation arise at once? If the cause does not exist immediately prior to the action, how is it caused? Two objects at the same time are not causally related. According to the momentarians, the birth of the soul, its materialization, the origin of its reformation are completed in a single moment. In fact the soul is the cause of happiness and sorrow and happiness and sorrow are the effect of the soul. The soul is the cause of happiness and misery, just as it is needed at the time of the origin of happiness as well as before the origin of happiness. Because if not, where will the helpless happiness and sorrow arise? According to momentarians, permanence is not possible in the second moment of origin of the soul. Because the happiness of the soul is not caused by the cause of sorrow. But actually the soul is the cause of happiness and unhappiness therefore the soul is eternal.

In fact, according to Buddhism, the former soul is the cause of the new soul. The cause must be present up to the time of origination because origination always waits for the cause.

All things can arise from all things by sudden origination. If the Buddhist says that the former soul resides until the origin of the new soul, then the co-existence of causality is admitted. But this contradicts the promise that ‘all the existence(sat) things are temporary’.

Now the question is, when Buddhists accept Impressions of karmic forces (samskāra), they have to accept a refuge because impressions of karmic forces (samskāra) cannot be without refuge. Buddhists say that the refuge of impressions of karmic forces (samskāra) is the science of Ālaya-vijñāna. This is the soul according to them due to the ephemerality of all things, this cosmology is also ephemeral. But whose form does not exist for some time, how can it be reformed? That which exists in the past, middle and hereafter, or any witness material without decay, is the only one worthy of refuge for reformation. If there is no such eternal substance, the reformation, memory, pratyabhijna that happened in the past becomes impossible. Therefore, the dark soul of samskāra is an eternal substance, it is not transitory. When the soul is transitory, worldly uses also cease. The relationship between father and son is destroyed, because the father is the father of son, the second moment of production is destroyed. A newly born soul cannot be called Janaka because it does not have Janaka. Moreover, we have the classical practice of wishing the child good luck before the birth of the child. Maharishi Kapil refuted the transience of the soul in this argument. Buddhists say that every moment the soul perishes, but from moment to moment the flow of the enlightened soul continues, so there is samskāra or Pratyabhijñā.

Now the Naiyāyika ask, is this momentary soul different from its child? If it is different, how will the other soul remember the object received by one soul, it is misused. And if it is not different, then the child is also temporary according to the argument of ‘most momentary’, so he does not have the ability to remember. If the child is a single substance separate from the child, the decision ‘at least for a moment’ would be lost, so the Naiyāyika would declare him to be the eternal soul.

Nyāya philosophy recognizes the rebirth of the soul and shows that the soul is eternal. The immortality of the soul is established. This soul incarnates again and again until it becomes the ultimate recluse of sorrows. Maharshi Gautama says, this rebirth of the soul is called Pretyabhāva. Commentator Vātsyāyana explains this and says that the reincarnation of the soul in a body after death is a Pretyabhāva.

Now it may be objected that impermanent objects have birth and death. But accepting the birth and death of impermanent objects disturbs impermanence. According to Vaināśika Buddhism, the soul has origin and annihilation, so the birth of the soul and death and rebirth after death are possible according to them, which is irrelevant to the immortality of the soul. In reply to the objection of the Pūrvapakṣa-vādi, the Naiyāyika say that Pretyabhāva i.e. rebirth after death cannot disturb the permanence of the soul. The immortality of the departed soul is what makes the ghost possible. The word pretyabhava does not mean the rebirth of the perished soul, but the re-incarnation of an imperishable soul after the destruction of the body.

‘Pra’ purvaka- ‘in’ dhatu means death and ‘bhu’ dhatu means death after origin, i.e. birth after annihilation, the Buddhists say. But if the soul is called Pratyabhāva by admitting the origin and destruction of the soul, the soul that has done the work before, the soul does not remain till the time of fruition, its “Kritahani” fault. And the soul which is not the doer of the previous action but is the beneficiary of that previous action is guilty of “Akritavagyam”. Both of these are absurd. So the commentator Vatsayana rejects this meaning as “kritahani” and “akritabhagyam” are doshas respectively if we take this meaning of pratyabhava in Buddhism.

The foregoing argument of the commentator will hold good for those who hold the view that the soul is perishable, and that all matter is subject, therefore the soul is subject, and that the body arises from the subject. That is, if there is no soul after death, it is impossible to enjoy the supernatural results of the soul’s karma, and if the soul has a hetu, that is, if the soul originates with the body, without this soul, it becomes impossible to enjoy the results of its previous karma. Thus the sages who are benevolent to all living beings, who have given advice on performing virtuous deeds and abstaining from unwholesome deeds, become fruitless. Therefore evangelism and rationalism about the soul are not acceptable. Therefore, it is proved by all our arguments that the soul is a permanent substance in the past, the middle and the hereafter. Atman originates indestructible, decaying, and growing, eternal and beginningless, and though old, is eternally new. Even if the body perishes, the soul never perishes.

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